Abstract
Inductive inference has always been a major concern in philosophy. This paper considers two different ways of thinking about induction: the classical way and the new, learning-theoretic way. After a brief introduction, I discuss the classical style of thinking about induction, which conceives of inductive inference as an extension of deductive argumentation. Then, I focus on the new, alternative learning-theoretic approach which sees induction as a type of computational process that converges to the truth. I conclude the paper by considering some of the important philosophical consequences of this fundamental shift in the metaphor through which philosophers conceive of inductive reasoning.
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Goethe, N.B. (2007). Two Ways of Thinking about Induction. In: Friend, M., Goethe, N.B., Harizanov, V.S. (eds) Induction, Algorithmic Learning Theory, and Philosophy. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6127-1_10
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