There is no single term in Aristotle’s works or other classical philosophical texts that could be translated as ‘consciousness’ on all occasions. No wonder that there have been some modern philosophers who have denied that Aristotle even had a notion of consciousness.1 However, the notion of consciousness is far from unambiguously understood and defined in today’s philosophy. There is a wide variety of uses for the term reaching from knowledge in general to intentionality, introspection, and phenomenal experience. The question whether Aristotle had a notion or a theory of consciousness cannot be informatively answered before explicating the kind of consciousness we are looking for.
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Sihvola, J. (2007). The Problem of Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology. In: Heinämaa, S., Lähteenmäki, V., Remes, P. (eds) Consciousness. Studies In The History Of Philosophy Of Mind, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6082-3_2
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