Skip to main content

The Impact of Uncertainty on Banking Behavior: Evidence from the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Accounting for Climate Change

Abstract

In this paper, we study empirically whether uncertainty has an influence on trade in the US sulfur dioxide allowances market. In particular, we investigate the role of uncertainty on banking behavior. To do this, we introduce a tractable, structural model of trading permits under uncertainty. The model establishes a relation between banking behavior and risk preferences, especially prudence in the Kimball (1990) sense. We then test this model using data on allowances, for utilities submitted to the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program, carried over from one year to the next. Evidence is found of imprudence, namely, utilities bank permits in order to favor higher profits. Another finding is that larger utilities do not adopt behavior significantly different from that of smaller ones.

This paper was presented at the “International Workshop on Uncertainty in Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Verification, Compliance & Trading” in Warsaw, Poland, September 2004, under the title “Portfolio Management of Emissions Permits and Prudence Behavior.”

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Albrecht, J., Verbeke T., & de Clercq, M. (2004). Informational Efficiency of the U.S. SO2 Permit Market, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Working Paper No. 250, Ghent University, Belgium.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arimura, T. H. (2002). An empirical study of the SO2 allowance market: effects of PUC regulations, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 271–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bailey, E. M. (1998). Allowance trading activity and state regulatory rulings: evidence from the u.s. acid rain program, MIT CEEPR Working Paper 98006, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldursson, F. M., & von der Fehr, N.-H. M. (2004). Price volatility and risk exposure: on market-based environmental policy instruments, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, 682–704.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ben-David, S., Brookshire, D., Burness, S., McKee, M., & Schmidt, C. (2000). Attitudes toward risk and compliance in emission permit market, Land Economics, 76, 590–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bohi, D. R., & Burtraw, D. (1997). SO2 Allowance trading: how do expectations and experience measure up? Electricity Journal, 10, 67–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Browning, M., & Lusardi, A. (1996). Household saving: micro theories and micro facts, Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 1797–1855.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burtraw, D. (1996). The SO2 emissions trading program: cost savings without allowance trades, Contemporary Economic Policy, 14, 79–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carlson, C., Burtraw, D., Cropper, M., & Palmer, K. L. (2000). Sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities: what are the gains from trade, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1292–1326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carlson, D. A., & Sholtz, A. M. (1994). Designing pollution market instruments: a case of uncertainty, Contemporary Economic Policy, 12, 114–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T., & Gangadharan, L. (2003). Transactions costs in tradable permit markets: an experimental study of pollution market designs, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 23, 145–165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chicago Climate Exchange. (2004). The Sulfur Dioxide Emission Allowance Trading Program: Market Architecture, Market Dynamics and Pricing, Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc., Chicagor, IL.

    Google Scholar 

  • Considine, T. J., & Larson, D. F. (2004). The Environment as a Factor of Production, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS 3271, Washington DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cronshaw, M., & Kruse, J. B. (1996). Regulated firms in pollution permit markets with banking, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9, 179–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cropper, M. L., & Oates, W. E. (1992). Environmental economics: a survey, Journal of Economic Literature, 30, 675–740.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dales, J. H. (1968). Pollution, Property and Prices, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eeckhoudt, L., & Gollier, C. (2005). The impact of prudence on optimal prevention, Economic Theory, 26, 989–994.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellerman, D. A., & Montero, J. P. (1998). The declining trend in sulfur dioxide emissions: implications for allowances prices, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 26–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellerman, D. A., Joskow, P. L., Schmalensee, R., Montero, J. P., & Bailey, E. M. (2000). Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Cambridge University Press, New York.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Energy Information Administration. (2004). Annual Energy Review 2003, US Department of Energy, EIA, Washington DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Godby, R. W., Mestelman, S. R., Muller, R. A., & Welland, J. D. (1997). Emissions trading with shares and coupons when control over discharges is uncertain, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, 359–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gollier, C. (2001). The Economics of Risk and Time, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hahn, R. W. (1984). Market power and transferable property rights, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 753–765.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hahn, R. W., & May, C. A. (1994). The behavior of the allowance market: theory and evidence, Electricity Journal, 7, 28–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hennessy, D. A., & Roosen, J. (1999). Stochastic pollution, permits and merger incentives, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 37, 211–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holthausen, D. M. (1979). Hedging and the competitive firm under price uncertainty, American Economic Review, 69, 989–995.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, P. L., & Schmalensee, R. (1998). The political economy of market-based environmental policy: the u.s. acid rain program, Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 89–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, P. L., Schmalensee, R., & Bailey E. M. (1998). The market for sulfur dioxide emissions, American Economic Review, 88, 669–685.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kazarosian, M. (1997). Precautionary savings — a panel study, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 241–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keeler, A. G. (1991). Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: some extensions, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 21, 180–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimball, M. S. (1990). Precautionary savings in the small and in the large, Econometrica, 58, 53–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kling, C. & Rubin, J. (1997). Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution, Journal of Public Economics, 64, 99–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liski, M., & Montero J. P. (2005). A note on market power in an emission permits market with banking, Environmental and Resource Economics, 31, 159–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lusardi, A. (1998). On the importance of the precautionary saving motive, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88, 449–453.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malik, A. S. (1990). Markets for pollution control when firms are non-compliant, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 18, 97–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malik, A. S. (2002). Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 371–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Misiolek, W. S., & Elder, H. W. (1989). Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 16, 156–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montero, J. P. (1997). Marketable pollution permits with uncertainty and transactions costs, Resource and Energy Economics, 20, 27–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montgomery, W. D. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs, Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rubin, J. (1996). A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking and borrowing, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31, 122–136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandmo, A. (1971). On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty, American Economic Review, 61, 65–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schennach, S. M. (2000). The economics of pollution permit banking in the context of title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40, 189–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmalensee, R., Joskow, P. L., Ellerman, D. A., Montero, J. P., & Bailey, E. M. (1998). An interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 53–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, J. (1988). Risky income, life-cycle consumption and precautionary savings, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, 237–255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swift, B. (2001). How environmental laws work: an analysis of the utility sectors response to regulation of nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide under the clean air act, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 14, 309–424.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tietenberg, T. H. (1985). Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Egteren, H., & Weber, M. (1996). Marketable permits, market power, and cheating, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 161–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Olivier Rousse .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 Springer Science + Business Media B.V.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rousse, O., Sévi, B. (2007). The Impact of Uncertainty on Banking Behavior: Evidence from the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program. In: Lieberman, D., Jonas, M., Nahorski, Z., Nilsson, S. (eds) Accounting for Climate Change. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5930-8_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics