Now that we have presented a theory of multi-agent knowledge in Chapter 2, a natural next step is to study how an agent’s epistemic attitude can change over time. We have in fact already seen that such changes are important: for instance in the Consecutive Numbers puzzle (Example 2.4), the information state of each agent changes as a result of an announcement by any of the agents (note that even the first announcement of a (“I don’t know the numbers” = ϕ) changes his information state: after uttering ϕ, we have that a knows that b knows that ϕ (KaKbϕ: in fact we even have KaKbKaKbϕ, etc.)).
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© 2008 Springer
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(2008). Belief Revision. In: Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Studies In Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, And Philosophy Of Science, vol 337. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5839-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5839-4_3
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