Abstract
This paper argues that common sense morality implies an asymmetry to the effect that there are stronger reasons not to cause to exist individuals whose lives will be miserable than to cause people whose lives will be worthwhile because it entails a theory of rights, according to which our general rights are negative. But it also argues that this theory of rights should be rejected in favour of a symmetrical morality which give us as much reason to see to it that worthwhile lives begin as that miserable lives do not.
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Persson, I. (2009). Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives. In: Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5697-0_2
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