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Folk Psychology Re-Assessed pp 137–156Cite as

The Regulative Dimension of Folk Psychology

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Authors
  1. Victoria McGeer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hertfordshire, U.K

    Daniel D. Hutto

  2. University of Durham, U.K

    Matthew Ratcliffe

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McGeer, V. (2007). The Regulative Dimension of Folk Psychology. In: Hutto, D.D., Ratcliffe, M. (eds) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_8

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