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Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation

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Authors
  1. Daniel D. Hutto
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hertfordshire, U.K

    Daniel D. Hutto

  2. University of Durham, U.K

    Matthew Ratcliffe

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Hutto, D.D. (2007). Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation. In: Hutto, D.D., Ratcliffe, M. (eds) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_7

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