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Gallagher, S. (2007). Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory. In: Hutto, D.D., Ratcliffe, M. (eds) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_4
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