In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch’s suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the intentionality of consciousness, both with respect to the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I show that these recent trends tend to naturalize intentionality and consciousness in directions compatible with the descriptive aspects of Gurwitsch’s constitutive phenomenology.
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Barresi, J. (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness, and Intentional Relations: From Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In: Embree, L. (eds) Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2892-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2892-2_4
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