In the absence of channels for legitimate contract resolution, violence emerges as an alternative regulatory mechanism between conflicting parties (Black, 1998, 1983). In criminal settings, forms of regulatory violence have been referred to in a number of ways (e.g., contract killings, criminal liquidations, or gangland killings). We use the term “account settlement” to represent lethal or violent conflict resolution methods in criminal settings.1 In this study, we examine fluctuation in an account settlement trend. Our empirical focus is exclusive to the Quebec context, in which account settlements represented approximately 17% of all homicides between 1985 and 1989 (Cusson, Beaulieu, & Cusson, 2003: 300).
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Morselli, C., Tanguay, D., Labalette, AM. (2008). Criminal Conflicts and Collective Violence: Biker-Related Account Settlements in Quebec, 1994–2001. In: Siegel, D., Nelen, H. (eds) Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies. Studies in Organized Crime, vol 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-74733-0_11
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