Abstract
Side-channel cryptanalysis is a new research area in applied cryptography that has gained more and more interest since the mid-nineties. It considers adversaries trying to take advantage of the physical specificities of actual cryptographic devices. These implementation-specific attacks frequently turn out to be much more efficient than the best known cryptanalytic attacks against the underlying primitive seen as an idealized object. This chapter aims to introduce such attacks with illustrative examples and to put forward a number of practical concerns related to their implementation and countermeasures.
Postdoctoral researcher of the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS).
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We just consider the univariate case in this example. But the extension toward the multivariate case where several leakage samples are considered is straightforward. Note also that in practice, one has to decide what to characterize. For example, one can build templates for different key candidates or for different Hamming weights at the output of an S-box. The selection of operations and data to characterize is important from a practical point of view since it determines the computational cost of the attack (i.e., building more templates is more expensive).
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Standaert, FX. (2010). Introduction to Side-Channel Attacks. In: Verbauwhede, I. (eds) Secure Integrated Circuits and Systems. Integrated Circuits and Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71829-3_2
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