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Interest Group Behavior and Influence

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The Encyclopedia of Public Choice

Abstract

During the last two decades economics has witnessed a remarkable upsurge in theoretical as well as empirical studies of the behavior and political influence of interest groups. Recent books by Sloof (1998), Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (2001) refer to a wealth of evidence of the significance of organized interests in the political arena, besides presenting surveys of theoretical studies. Political economics definitively seems to move away from the common assumption of atomistic demand in ‘political markets’ (the median voter model) towards a more realistic framework. In a sense it is picking up and deepening some older strands of literature inspired by classical writers on political economy (like Marx and Pareto), the so-called pluralists in political science (like Bentley and Truman), and others, who were concerned with the political impact of particular social groups under the label of ‘factions’, ‘classes’, or ‘elites’ (see e.g., Bottomore, 1970; Moe 1980). The modern political economic literature to be surveyed in this paper, however, is characterized by much greater rigor, through the use mathematical modeling, and keener attention for individual incentives.

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  1. Frans van Winden
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  1. The Locke Institute, George Mason University, USA

    Charles K. Rowley

  2. Institute of Economic Policy, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria

    Friedrich Schneider

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van Winden, F. (2004). Interest Group Behavior and Influence. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_10

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