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Modeling cryptographic protocols and their collusion analysis

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Information Hiding (IH 1996)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1174))

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Abstract

As network applications such as electronic commerce proliferate, complex communications protocols that employ cryptographic building blocks, such as encryption and authentication, will become more common. We view a cryptographic protocol as a process by which information is transferred among some users and hidden from others. The collusion property of a protocol measures how well it hides information. The collusion problem determines whether a subset of users can discover, through collusion, the information that is designed to be hidden from them during or after a protocol's execution. We introduce a model for a general multiparty cryptographic protocol and its collusion analysis. The model has two components, one modeling the protocol phase and the other the subsequent collusion phase. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which such collusion is possible. Based on this characterization we design an algorithm that checks whether the condition is satisfied, and when it is, computes an efficient collusion process.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of EEE, University of Melbourne, Australia

    Steven H. Low

  2. Bell Laboratories, 07974, Murray Hill, NJ, USA

    Nicholas F. Maxemchuk

Authors
  1. Steven H. Low
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  2. Nicholas F. Maxemchuk
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Editor information

Ross Anderson

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Low, S.H., Maxemchuk, N.F. (1996). Modeling cryptographic protocols and their collusion analysis. In: Anderson, R. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1174. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61996-8_40

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61996-8_40

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61996-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49589-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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