Worst-Case Equilibria

  • Elias Koutsoupias
  • Christos Papadimitriou
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38

Volume 1563 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Koutsoupias E., Papadimitriou C. (1999) Worst-Case Equilibria. In: Meinel C., Tison S. (eds) STACS 99. STACS 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1563. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elias Koutsoupias
    • 1
  • Christos Papadimitriou
    • 2
  1. 1.Univ of CaliforniaLos Angeles
  2. 2.Univ of CaliforniaBerkeley