In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.
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- Worst-Case Equilibria
- Book Title
- STACS 99
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- 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science Trier, Germany, March 4–6, 1999 Proceedings
- pp 404-413
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- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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