Abstract
The paper shows how a model checkable logic of belief and time (MATL) can be used to check properties of security protocols employed in computer networks. In MATL, entities participating to protocols are modeled as concurrent processes able to have beliefs about other entities. The approach is applied to the verification of TLS, the Internet Standard Protocol that IETF derived from the SSL 3.0 of Netscape. The results of our analysis show that the protocol satisfies all the security requirements for which it was designed.
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Benerecetti, M., Panti, M., Spalazzi, L., Tacconi, S. (2002). Verification of the SSL/TLS Protocol Using a Model Checkable Logic of Belief and Time. In: Anderson, S., Felici, M., Bologna, S. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability and Security. SAFECOMP 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2434. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45732-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45732-1_14
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