Abstract
The hospitals/residents problem is an extensively-studied many-one stable matching problem. Here, we consider the hospitals/ residents problem where ties are allowed in the preference lists. In this extended setting, a number of natural definitions for a stable matching arise. We present the first linear-time algorithm for the problem under the strongest of these criteria, so-called superstability. Our new results have applications to large-scale matching schemes, such as the National Resident Matching Program in the US, and similar schemes elsewhere.
Supported by Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant number GR/M13329.
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Irving, R.W., Manlove, D.F., Scott, S. (2000). The Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties. In: Algorithm Theory - SWAT 2000. SWAT 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1851. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44985-X_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44985-X_24
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