Abstract
Two simple redundancy schemes are shown to be inadequate in securing RSA signatures against attacks based on multiplicative properties. The schemes generalize the requirement that each valid message starts or ends with a fixed number of zero bits. Even though only messages with proper redundancy are signed, forgers are able to construct signatures on messages of their choice.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Chaum, D., “Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems to make Big Brother Obsolete,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 10, October 1985, pp. 1030–1044.
Davida, G.I., “Chosen Signature Cryptanalysis of the RSA (MIT) Public Key Cryptosystem,” Technical Report TR-CS-82-2, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee WI, October 1982.
de Jonge, W., “Attacks on RSA Signatures and Countermeasures,” in Security and Privacy in Information Systems: some technical aspects, Ph.D. Thesis, June 1985.
DeMillo, R.A. and Merritt, M.J., “Chosen Signature Cryptanalysis of Public Key Cryptosystems,” Technical Memorandum, School of Information and Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta GA, October 25, 1982.
Denning, D.E., “The Many-Time Pad: Theme and Variations” Proceedings of the 1983 Symposium on Security and Privacy, April 25–27, 1983; the relevant part also appeared as “Digital Signatures with RSA and Other Public-Key Cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 27, No. 4, April 1984, pp. 388–392.
Knuth, D.E., The art of computer programming, Volume 2, Seminumerical Algorithms, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L., “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21, No. 2, February 1978, pp. 120–126.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
de Jonge, W., Chaum, D. (1986). Attacks on Some RSA Signatures. In: Williams, H.C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’85 Proceedings. CRYPTO 1985. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 218. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39799-X_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39799-X_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-16463-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39799-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive