Abstract
A second-price sealed-bid auction is that a bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price. This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction. An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret. We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p 0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results, and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.
This work has been supported by the Telecommunications Advancement Organization of Japan under the grant for international joint research related to information-communications.
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Omote, K., Miyaji, A. (2003). A Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction with Verifiable Discriminant of p 0-th Root. In: Blaze, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_5
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