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Automated Analysis of Infinite Scenarios

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Book cover Trustworthy Global Computing (TGC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3705))

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Abstract

The security of a network protocol crucially relies on the scenario in which the protocol is deployed. This paper describes syntactic constructs for modelling network scenarios and presents an automated analysis tool, which can guarantee that security properties hold in all of the (infinitely many) instances of a scenario. The tool is based on control flow analysis of the process calculus LySa and is applied to the Bauer, Berson, and Feiertag protocol where is reveals a previously undocumented problem, which occurs in some scenarios but not in other.

An erratum to this chapter can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11580850_20 .

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Buchholtz, M. (2005). Automated Analysis of Infinite Scenarios. In: De Nicola, R., Sangiorgi, D. (eds) Trustworthy Global Computing. TGC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3705. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11580850_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11580850_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30007-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31483-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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