Abstract
The variety of possible anonymity network topologies has spurred much debate in recent years. In a synchronous batching design, each batch of messages enters the mix network together, and the messages proceed in lockstep through the network. We show that a synchronous batching strategy can be used in various topologies, including a free-route network, in which senders choose paths freely, and a cascade network, in which senders choose from a set of fixed paths. We show that free-route topologies can provide better anonymity as well as better message reliability in the event of partial network failure.
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Dingledine, R., Shmatikov, V., Syverson, P. (2005). Synchronous Batching: From Cascades to Free Routes. In: Martin, D., Serjantov, A. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3424. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_12
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