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Words and Intelligence I pp 217–253Cite as

Belief Ascription, Metaphor, and Intensional Identification

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Part of the book series: Text, Speech and Language Technology ((TLTB,volume 35))

This article discusses the extension of ViewGen, an algorithm derived for belief ascription, to the areas of intensional object identification and metaphor. ViewGen represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition sets known as environments. Environments are convenient, even essential, for addressing important pragmatic issues of reasoning. The article concentrates on showing that the transfer of information in metaphors, intensional object identification, and ordinary, nonmetaphorical belief ascription can all be seen as different manifestations of a single environment-amalgamation process. The article also briefly discusses the extension of ViewGen to speech-act processing and the addition of a heuristic-based, relevance-determination procedure, and justifies the partitioning approach to belief ascription

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Geneva, Switzerland

    Afzal Ballim

  2. Computer Science, University of Sheffield, S14DP, Sheffield, United Kingdom

    Yorick Wilks & John Barnden

Authors
  1. Afzal Ballim
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  2. Yorick Wilks
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  3. John Barnden
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

    Khurshid Ahmad

  2. University of Sheffield, UK

    Christopher Brewster

  3. University of Sheffield, UK

    Mark Stevenson

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Ballim, A., Wilks, Y., Barnden, J. (2007). Belief Ascription, Metaphor, and Intensional Identification. In: Ahmad, K., Brewster, C., Stevenson, M. (eds) Words and Intelligence I. Text, Speech and Language Technology, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5285-5_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5285-5_9

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