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A Logical Framework for Convention

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Sillari, G. (2005). A Logical Framework for Convention. In: Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4631-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4631-6_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-4630-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-4631-5

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