Abstract
This chapter surveys recent developments on some basic solution concepts, like stable sets, the core, the nucleolus and the modiclus for a very special class of cooperative games, namely assignment games with transferable utility. The existence of a stable set for assignment games is still an open problem.
Partially funded by N.S.F. Grant DMS 0072678.
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Raghavan, T.E.S., Sudhölter, P. (2006). On Assignment Games. In: Haurie, A., Muto, S., Petrosjan, L.A., Raghavan, T.E.S. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 8. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4501-2_10
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