Abstract
The clarification of protocol goals and of the assumptions made about the environment protocols are intended for is an important but sometimes underestimated step in protocol design and analysis. Implicit assumptions about the environment can profoundly influence our understanding of security and may mislead us when faced with new challenges. Five case studies will support these claims. Research on novel security properties and on the influence of assumptions about the environment are proposed as major challenges in protocol design and analysis.
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Gollmann, D. (2005). Challenges in Protocol Design and Analysis. In: Lee, D.T., Shieh, S.P., Tygar, J.D. (eds) Computer Security in the 21st Century. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24006-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24006-3_2
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