Chapter

Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '98

Volume 1462 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 26-45

Date:

Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes

  • Mihir BellareAffiliated withDept. of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego
  • , Anand DesaiAffiliated withDept. of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego
  • , David PointchevalAffiliated withLaboratoire d'Informatique de l'École Normale SupérieureGREYC, Dépt d'Informatique, Université de Caen
  • , Phillip RogawayAffiliated withDept. of Computer Science, Engineering II Bldg., University of California at Davis

Abstract

We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.