Key agreement protocols and their security analysis

Extended Abstract
  • Simon Blake-Wilson
  • Don Johnson
  • Alfred Menezes
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/BFb0024447

Volume 1355 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Blake-Wilson S., Johnson D., Menezes A. (1997) Key agreement protocols and their security analysis. In: Darnell M. (eds) Crytography and Coding. Cryptography and Coding 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1355. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

This paper proposes new protocols for two goals: authenticated key agreement and authenticated key agreement with key confirmation in the asymmetric (public-key) setting. A formal model of distributed computing is provided, and a definition of the goals within this model supplied. The protocols proposed are then proven correct within this framework in the random oracle model. We emphasize the relevance of these theoretical results to the security of systems used in practice. Practical implementation of the protocols is discussed. Such implementations are currently under consideration for standardization [2, 3, 18].

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon Blake-Wilson
    • 1
  • Don Johnson
    • 2
  • Alfred Menezes
    • 3
  1. 1.Dept. of Mathematics, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamUK
  2. 2.Certicom Corp.MississaugaCanada
  3. 3.Dept. of Discrete and Statistical SciencesAuburn UniversityAuburnUSA