Abstract
I argue that if the future is infinite, as contemporary astronomers believe it is, then moral nihilism is true if both moral realism and aggregative value theory is true. Usually, moral nihilism is defined as meaning nothing has value. But I am a moral realist, indeed a global moral realist, since I believe everything has value. I argued that everything is intrinsically valuable in my 1997 Ethical And Religious Thought In Analytic Philosophy Of Language. Nonetheless, I believe the recent astronomical discovery that future time is infinite implies that it does not morally matter what we do. This is what I mean by moral nihilism. It does not matter what actions humans or other agents perform. My derivation of moral nihilism has as one of its premises that moral realism is true. So this is a different approach from that of emotivists such as A. J. Ayer or relativists such as Nagel, Nietzsche and Sartre, who derived moral nihilism from moral anti-realism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Cain, J. “Infinite Utility.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 401–04.
Nelson, M. “Utilitarian Eschatology.” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 339–47.
Segerberg, K. “A Neglected Family of Aggregation Problems in Ethics.” Noûs 10 (1976): 221–44.
Smith, Q. Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
Vallentyne, P. “Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1993): 212–17.
Vallentyne, P. “Infinite Utility: Anonymity and Person-Centredness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 413–420.
Vallentyne, P. and S. Kagan. “Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 5–26.
Van Liedekerke, L. “Should Utilitarians be Cautious about an Infinte Future?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 405–407.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Smith, Q. (2003). Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism. In: Dyke, H. (eds) Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6297-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3530-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive