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Introduction

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Part of the book series: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 31))

Abstract

This introduction opens a discussion about what we call here “Cartesian Empiricisms.” Under this label we place some of the complex transformations of Descartes’ ideas in the second half of the seventeenth century. Our aim is to highlight the use of experiment within the Cartesian framework, which—with the exception of a few scattered studies on seventeenth-century Cartesians—was largely neglected in the literature. In this introduction, we provide an overview of Cartesian scholarship and the use of the rationalist-empiricist distinction in both the history of philosophy and the history of science; we show that the rationalist-empiricist narrative is in crisis and contend that examining figures who do not neatly fit the dichotomy is a useful approach to a re-evaluation of the period. We end with a summary of the chapters, which cover a number of Cartesians strongly committed to the importance of experimental natural philosophy and further our understanding of how Cartesians in the second half of the seventeenth century understood and utilized knowledge from observation, experience, and experiment.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For some examples see: Gaukroger 1980, 2002; Osler 1985, 1994; Hatfield 1985, 1988; Clarke 1989; Nadler 1990; Garber 1992, 2001b, 2002; Grene 1995; Armogathe and Belgioioso 1996; Gabbey 1998; Des Chene 2000; Gaukroger et al. 2000; Roux and Garber 2013 (especially Chap. 3 by Roux 2013); Kolesnik-Antoine 2013.

  2. 2.

    There is a difference between the English and French literature on this topic. French scholars pointed out Descartes’ interest in experiments and empirical knowledge much earlier. See for example Liard 1882; Milhaud 1921; Mouy 1934; Laporte 1945 [1988]. English scholars discovered it quite late—and, in some sense, with great surprise—as it is the case of Clarke 1982, where Descartes is largely presented as an Empiricist.

  3. 3.

    For some examples see: Burtt 1924, Chap. 4; Keeling 1934, Chap. 5; Scott 1952; Smith 1953, Chap. 8; Blackwell 1966; Aiton 1972; Prendergast 1972–1973, 1975; Williams 1978, Chap. 9; Hatfield 1979.

  4. 4.

    Butterfield 1949; Koyré 1957. This twentieth-century historiography of science assumed the Rationalist-Empiricist distinction and re-instantiated Newtonian propaganda from the eighteenth century. See Chap. 4 by Van Bunge. See also Cohen 1985; Christie 1990; Shank 2008. On the history of the “big picture” see Cunningham and Williams 1993. The scientific revolution narrative espoused in Butterfield and Koyré was replicated and further developed by their students and other scholars throughout the twentieth century. For examples, see Hall 19074; Kuhn 1957; Gillispie 1960; Dijksterjuis 1961; Westfall 1971. Note that these works were re-released in new editions or versions throughout the twentieth century, holding an impressive influence.

  5. 5.

    Kuhn 1962 (see 1996 edition, 48, 148).

  6. 6.

    For examples of other works in this direction see Barker and Ariew 1991; Hatfield 1985, 1992, 1996a; Garber 1992, 1998, 2001a; Friedman 1992, 1993, 2010.

  7. 7.

    Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I in Locke 1975.

  8. 8.

    See Tennemann 1852; Fischer 1854–1877; Russell 1912; Randall 1940; Cottingham 1984, 1988; Copleston 1958, 1959; Gilson and Langan 1963.

  9. 9.

    For examples on Descartes, see Clarke 1983. On Leibniz see Francks 1985; Brown 1985. On Spinoza see Brown 1985; Stewart 2007. On Locke see Hanratty 1995; Loeb 1981; Pap 1958; Woolhouse 1971. On Berkeley see Bracken 1974; Hanratty 1995; Ayers 2005. On Hume see Popkin 1959b, 1964; Stewart 1985.

  10. 10.

    For examples, see Popkin 1959a; Ryle 1960; Matson 1968; Buchdahl 1969; Bracken 1974; Mandelbaum 1976, 1977; Loeb 1981; Norton 1981; Brown 1985; Holland 1983; Ishiguro 1986; Kenny 1986; Sorell 1993; Haakonssen 2006; Fraenkel et al. 2011. There were some exceptions. Ayers 1984, 2005. Perler 1998, for instance, argued for categorizing philosophers as Continental Rationalist or British Empiricists.

  11. 11.

    For example, von Leyden 1968; Collins 1972, 8.

  12. 12.

    For example, see Scruton 1982; Cottingham 1984, 1988; Priest 1990; Sorell 1993; Hanratty 1995; Garrett and Barbanell 1997; Perler 1998; Woolhouse 1998; Bennett 2001; Schneewind 2004.

  13. 13.

    For examples, see Loeb 1981; Cottingham 1988; Lennon 1993; Perler 1998; and Anstey et al. 2010.

  14. 14.

    For a discussion of an alternative approach, see Corneanu 2011.

  15. 15.

    Voltaire 1741, 89 (it is also cited in Newtonian Studies, Chap. 3; see Koyré 1968, 55).

  16. 16.

    See D’Alembert 1995.

  17. 17.

    Voltaire 1741, 98.

  18. 18.

    For a discussion of this uneasy relation between Cartesians and Newtonians, see Shank 2008.

  19. 19.

    Loeb 1981, 28 and 30. Not unlike Hanratty, who will soon be discussed, Loeb makes the point that even though the Rationalist-Empiricist distinction is “fatally flawed” he is not saying that it is impossible to come up with other criterion that result in the same six canonical figures, placing Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza in one category and Locke, Berkeley and Hume in another (see pp. 70–71).

  20. 20.

    Hanratty 1995, 10.

  21. 21.

    Hanratty 1995, 11.

  22. 22.

    Loeb 1981, 363, emphasis is ours.

  23. 23.

    Lennon 1993.

  24. 24.

    In their manifesto for the use of this new terminology, the Otago team claim “Philosophers from the early modern period (from Descartes to Hume) are normally divided into Rationalists and Empiricists. Yet this distinction was developed by neo-Kantian philosophers from the late 18th century. In this research project we are exploring the hypothesis that there is a far better way of approaching early modern philosophers. Our central thesis is that the most common and the most important distinction in early modern philosophy is that between Experimental and Speculative Philosophy. This is a distinction that many of the actors actually used, and, we claim, it can explain all that the traditional distinction can explain and more besides” (See Anstey et al. 2010).

  25. 25.

    See Anstey 2005, 237.

  26. 26.

    See Anstey and Vanzo 2012, 20 (our emphasis).

  27. 27.

    For examples of synthesis see Chap. 2 by Ariew; Chap. 5 by Smith; Chap. 10 by Nyden.

  28. 28.

    See Ariew 2006 on Desgabets, Régis, Lamy, Bayle, and Du Roure; Lennon and Easton 1992 on François Bayle; Easton 2000 on Desgabets; Schmaltz 2002 on Régis and Desgabets; and Cook 2008 on Desgabets.

  29. 29.

    Note that Roger Ariew makes the stronger claim that empiricism was the predominant view among Cartesians in the second half of the seventeenth century. Ariew 2006, 73.

  30. 30.

    AT IXb 20, CSM I 189.

  31. 31.

    Letter from Balthasar Bekker, S.T.D. and Minister of Amsterdam, to the two honorable pastors D. Joannes Alstius, from Hoornaar, and D. Paulus Steenwinkel, from Schelluinen, concerning their remarks on the first part of his work, De Betoverde Weereld (The World Bewitched). Quoted in Thijssen-Schoute 1989, 515: “Al waar ik met hem ga, word ik van U gepresen, maar daar ik van hem wijke, acht gij dat ik doole. Doch dus hard Cartesiaansch te zijn is niet Cartesiaansch.” Interestingly, a few decades later Willem ‘s Gravesande responded to similar charges for not being Newtonian enough because he abandoned Newton’s views on living force. His defense is similar to Bekker’s: “He only, who in Physics reasons from Phenomena, rejecting all feign’d Hypothes, and pursues this Method inviolably to the best of his Power, endeavours to follow the Steps of Sir Isaac Newton, and very justly declares that he is a Newtonian Philosopher; and not he, who implicitly follows the Opinion of any particular Person.” ‘s Gravesande 1747, xi.

  32. 32.

    For developments in Descartes’ writings see Machamer and McGuire 2009; Schuster 2012. For the metaphysical foundation of Descartes’ natural philosophy, see Garber 1992; Gaukroger 2002; de Buzon and Carraud 1994; Hatfield 1985.

  33. 33.

    See Desgabets 1983–1985, V, 156 (OPD 5, 156). We shall return shortly to this passage.

  34. 34.

    See the Philosophical Transactions 1667, 480. For Descartes, the pineal gland is the central place where all the nerves meet; hence, it mediates the capacity of humans and animals to move.

  35. 35.

    See Cordemoy 1668. An example of the literature generated on the problem of the animal-machines is Pardies 1672. It is worth citing here the attempts to provide mechanical explanations to different bodily functions, including the human body. While these attempts originate in Descartes’ manuscript of L’homme, a greater influence on the reception of Descartes’ ideas is due to Clerselier’s edition of 1664. For the importance of this edition, see Zittel 2011.

  36. 36.

    See Desgabets (1983–1985), V, 156 (OPD 5, 156): “C’est là proprement le sujet des Méditations de M. Descartes touchant la première philosophie qu’il a toujours regardées comme son chef d’œuvre, et où néanmoins je trouve des défauts considérables qu’on ne peut corriger qu’à la gloire de ce grand philosophe qui fournit lui-même les moyens de leur donner leur dernière perfection et les remèdes au mal qu’il a fait. Je me suis donc proposé de travailler à une chose si nécessaire, dans cet ouvrage que j’appelle le premier supplément de sa philosophie, d’autant que je tâche d’y rectifier ses propres pensée dans les choses où il me semble qu’il a quitté le droit chemin qui conduit à la vérité; au lieu qu’on pourrait appeler second supplément, l’application nouvelle que l’on ferait de ses principes incontestables à des phénomènes qu’il n’a pas connus, ou à des vérités dont il n’a point parlé; et c’est à cette sorte de second supplément que MM. de Cordemoy, Rohault, de la Forge, Clauberg et autres ont travaillé dans les beaux ouvrages qu’il ont donnés au public, où l’on voit de quelle manière nous pourrons étendre nos connaissances à des choses également belles et utiles.”

  37. 37.

    These are not well-defined categories and each philosopher discussed in this volume will use experiments in their own way. For example of discussions of experience and experiment in the early modern period see Garber 2001b, Chap. 14, 296–328. For a recent account of the multiple transformations in the meaning of the terms associated with empirical practice, such as “observation” or “experiment,” see Daston and Lünbeck 2011.

  38. 38.

    Schmaltz 2002, 11: “Given this variety in opinions among Descartes’ followers in France, there is reason to speak not of a single movement, French Cartesianism, but rather a variety of French Cartesianisms.”

  39. 39.

    Gary Hatfield offers a similar argument about the use of “scientific revolution,” which is infused with our contemporary notion of “science,” a notion that does not map on to seventeenth-century language and thought. Hatfield 1996b, 512: “Yet in learning to focus on the’scientific’ facets of seventeenth-century natural philosophy and mathematical science, we learn to slice away the parts of the texts we read or the institutions we study that do not constitute a proper part of the development of science as we now understand it.”

  40. 40.

    See Chap. 7 by Bellis, 142; Verbeek 1993, viii.

  41. 41.

    Chapter 7 by Bellis, 181.

  42. 42.

    Chapter 8 by Easton, 199.

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Dobre, M., Nyden, T. (2013). Introduction. In: Dobre, M., Nyden, T. (eds) Cartesian Empiricisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 31. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7690-6_1

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