Abstract
Experimental studies of how juries reach their verdicts in court strongly suggest that coherence reasoning is ubiquitous in judicial reasoning. Under massive cognitive pressure to process large numbers of conflicting pieces of evidence and witness reports, jury members base their judgment on an assessment of the most coherent account of the events. From a normative perspective, the legitimacy of coherence reasoning in court hinges on the premise that such coherence is a plausible guide to justified belief. Unfortunately, this notion has been severely challenged by numerous recent studies in Bayesian formal epistemology. Bovens and Hartmann (2003) (Bayesian epistemology). New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press and Olsson (2005) (Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification). Oxford: Oxford University Press have shown that there is no way to measure coherence such that coherence is truth conducive in the sense that more coherence implies a higher likelihood of truth. This is so even under seemingly very weak boundary conditions. In previous work we have shown that (certain forms of) coherence can be reliability conducive in paradigmatic scenarios where such coherence fails to be truth conducive. In other words, more coherence can still be indicative of a higher probability that the witnesses are reliable. We have also argued that the connection between (certain forms of) coherence and probability of reliability may be what justifies our common reliance on coherence reasoning. While the link between coherence and reliability was found to be not completely general, our studies so far do support the contention that this link is stronger than that between coherence and truth. In this paper, we add credence to this conclusion by proving several new formal results connecting one prominent measure of coherence, the Shogenji measure, to witness reliability. The most striking of these results is that in a case where the witnesses’ degrees of reliability are maximally dependent of each other—i.e., where either all witnesses are reliable or all witnesses are unreliable—the Shogenji measure is reliability conducive. We also relate our approach to the Evidentiary Value tradition in Scandinavian legal theory.
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Notes
- 1.
The following account of psychologists’ work on coherence is based on that given in Harris and Hahn (2009).
- 2.
Throughout this article we will rely on the normative correctness of Bayesian reasoning. Even though people do not always live up to Bayesian standards (see, e.g., Fischoff and Lichtenstein 1978; Kahneman et al. 1982; Rapoport and Wallsten 1972; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) the consensus position among epistemologists is that we should update our beliefs along the lines prescribed by Bayesianism (see, e.g., Howson and Urbach 1989).
- 3.
Exactly how to interpret probability (in terms of frequencies, betting rates, etc.) is a major topic in itself which is best left out of this overview. See Olsson (2002) for a detailed discussion.
- 4.
Below, we introduce a version of the witness scenario which uses weaker assumptions than these.
- 5.
An interestingly different impossibility proof was established by Bovens and Hartmann in their (2003) book.
- 6.
This theorem was proved against the backdrop of an improved version of the witness scenario that is introduced in the next section.
- 7.
They call it the ‘likelihood measure’. Often, the ordinally equivalent measure \( {S_l}=\log\;P(E|H)/P(E|\neg H) \) is used instead. In the confirmation literature, ordinal equivalents are treated as identical, though, for all intents and purposes.
- 8.
- 9.
The consequences of relaxing the assumption that P(H|Ae) = 1 are investigated in Sahlin (1986).
- 10.
In this context, it is worth pointing out that the EVM has salient similarities to several of the most prominent mathematical theories of evidence. Cases in point include the well-known Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Dempster 1967, 1969; Shafer 1976) (the similarities between the EVM and the Dempster-Shafer theory are commented upon extensively in several of the papers in Gärdenfors et al. (1983)) and, in particular, J.L. Cohen’s theory of evidence, as developed in his (1977). Cohen defines a notion of ‘Baconian probability’ (as opposed to the standard, ‘Pascalian’ notion, as Cohen calls it) in terms of ‘provability’, so that if we do not have any evidence for either P nor \( \neg \) P, the probability of P, and that of \( \neg \) P, equals zero, and argues that it is this notion of probability, rather than the standard Pascalian one, that is the relevant one in judicial contexts. Now the EVM theorists differ from Cohen in that they use the Pascalian notion of probability, rather than the Baconian one, but this seems to be a mere terminological difference: they too argue, as we saw, that what is relevant in judicial contexts is not how likely the evidentiary theme is but rather how likely it is that there is a reliable connection between the evidence and the evidentiary theme—i.e., how strong our proof is. This focus on the likelihood of the presence of a proof/reliable mechanism helps Cohen and the EVM theorists to avoid a standard objection against mathematical theories of evidence. Mathematical theories of evidence which say that the suspect should be convicted if and only if the posterior (Pascalian) probability is above a certain threshold (say 90%) depend for their success on our ability to assess the prior probability that the suspect is guilty. Such assessments are of course fraught with difficulties in any context but particularly so in judicial context: e.g., Rawling (1999) argues that the so-called ‘presumption of innocence’—an important tenet of U.S. criminal law—requires us to set the prior probability of the suspect’s guilt so low as to de facto make a conviction impossible. As Rawling himself suggests (ibid., pp. 124–125) a way out of this conundrum is to adopt a theory which focuses on the strength of the proof, rather than on the likelihood that the suspect in fact did it. Rawling mentions Cohen’s theory, but in view of the above-mentioned similarities between this theory and the EVM, it would seem the latter would do the job as well.
- 11.
- 12.
All new formal results in this paper were proved by Schubert.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of theorem 3:
Let \( {\boldsymbol{R}_1},\ldots,{\boldsymbol{R}_n},{\boldsymbol{E}_1},\ldots,{\boldsymbol{E}_n},{\boldsymbol{A}_1},\ldots,{\boldsymbol{A}_n} \) be propositional variables. Then:
Using this derivation, we calculate the probability of \( P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1},\ldots,{E_n}} \right.} \right) \), which equals \( P\left( {{R_i}\left| {{E_1},\ldots,{E_n}} \right.} \right) \), for any i. Let:
Then:
where \( {b_k}=\sum\limits_{{1<{q_2}<\ldots <{q_r}\leq n,r=n-k}} {\frac{{{a_{{1,{q_2},\ldots,{q_r}}}}}}{{{a_1},{a_{{{q_2}}}},\ldots,{a_{{{q_r}}}}}}} \)
where \( {c_k}=\sum\limits_{{{q_1}<,\ldots,<{q_r}\leq n,r=n-k}} {\frac{{{a_{{{q_1},\ldots,{q_r}}}}}}{{{a_{{{q_1}}}},\ldots,{a_{{{q_r}}}}}}} \)
Hence:
Proof of theorem 4:
Let \( \boldsymbol{R},{\boldsymbol{E}}_{\textbf{1}},\ldots,{\boldsymbol{E}}_{\boldsymbol{n}},{\boldsymbol{A}}_{\textbf 1},\ldots,{\boldsymbol{A}}_{\boldsymbol{n}} \) be propositional variables. Then:
Then:
Let:
Then:
Thus P(R|E 1,…,E n ) is a strictly increasing function of C Sh (A 1,…, A n ), given the assumptions of the scenario. Hence, the Shogenji measure is reliability conducive, in the present scenario.
Proofs of observation 3 and 4:
(see proof of theorem 4)
Hence:
Proofs of observation 6 and 7:
See proof of theorem 4.
Proof of observation 9:
Assume for reductio that:
Let P(H) = h. P(H) is the probability of what the witnesses agree upon.
(Schubert 2011, 273) together with condition (vii)
But this contradicts condition (v), which says that 0 < h < 1. Hence \( P\left( {{R_1}\vee {R_2}\left| {{E_1},{E_2}} \right.} \right)\geq P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1}} \right.} \right)+P\left( {{R_2}\left| {{E_2}} \right.} \right)-P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1}} \right.} \right)P\left( {{R_2}\left| {{E_2}} \right.} \right) \).
Proof of observation 10:
(Schubert 2011, 273) together with condition (vii)
Hence \( P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1},{E_2}} \right.,\neg {R_2}} \right)=P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1}} \right.} \right) \)
Proof of observation 11:
(Schubert 2011, 273) together with condition (vii)
Assume for reductio that \( P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1},{E_2}} \right.} \right)<P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1}} \right.} \right) \)
But, since \( 1>m>0 \) and \( 1>h>0 \), this cannot hold. Hence \( P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1},{E_2}} \right.} \right)\geq P\left( {{R_1}\left| {{E_1}} \right.} \right) \).
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Schubert, S., Olsson, E.J. (2013). Coherence and Reliability in Judicial Reasoning. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Šavelka, J. (eds) Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 107. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0_2
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