The Later Wittgenstein On Certainty

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s significance does not only come from helping transform our entrenched paradigm of the nature of language, but also come from his bold challenge of skepticism.

His, posthumously edited and published work On Certainty questions the Cartesian skepticism. However, this book is interpreted in a variety of ways. Some Wittgenstein scholars assert that he commits himself to foundationalism in the book. Deborah Orr, Elizabeth Wolgast, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Avrum Stroll are scholars interpreting the book in this way.

In this article, I assert that although Wittgenstein questions the Cartesian type of skepticism, still he is not a foundationalist philosopher in the traditional sense of the word.

The first section deals with the main argument of On Certainty. The second section focuses on interpreters asserting that Wittgenstein is a foundationalist philosopher and the third chapter is the statement of my interpretation of Wittgenstein.