Making Contact with Observations
- Ioannis VotsisAffiliated withPhilosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf Email author
Jim Bogen and James Woodward’s ‘Saving the Phenomena’, published only 20 years ago, has become a modern classic. Their centrepiece idea is a distinction between data and phenomena. Data are typically the kind of things that are publicly observable or measurable like “bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological experiments” (p. 306). Phenomena are “relatively stable and general features of the world which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by general theory” and are typically unobservable (Woodward 1989, p. 393). Examples of the latter category include “weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 306). Theories, in Bogen and Woodward’s view, are utilised to systematically explain and predict phenomena, not data (pp. 305–306). The relationship between theories and data is rather indirect. Data count as evidence for phenomena and the latter in turn count as evidence for theories. This view has been further elaborated in subsequent papers (Bogen and Woodward 1992, 2005; Woodward 1989) and is becoming increasingly influential (e.g., Basu 2003; Psillos 2004; Mauricio Suárez 2005).
- Making Contact with Observations
- Book Title
- EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences
- Book Subtitle
- Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association
- pp 267-277
- Print ISBN
- Online ISBN
- Springer Netherlands
- Copyright Holder
- Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
- Additional Links
- eBook Packages
- Editor Affiliations
- ID1. Fac. Filosofía, Depto. Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- ID2. Dipto. Filosofia, Universita di Roma, Tre
- ID3. Political Science, Dept. Philosophy, Logic &, London School of Economics &
- Ioannis Votsis (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany
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