Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting

  • Fabrice Benhamouda
  • Geoffroy Couteau
  • David Pointcheval
  • Hoeteck Wee
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_6

Volume 9216 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Benhamouda F., Couteau G., Pointcheval D., Wee H. (2015) Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting. In: Gennaro R., Robshaw M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2015. CRYPTO 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9216. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We introduce implicit zero-knowledge arguments (\(\mathsf{iZK }\)) and simulation-sound variants thereof (\(\mathsf{SSiZK }\)); these are lightweight alternatives to zero-knowledge arguments for enforcing semi-honest behavior. Our main technical contribution is a construction of efficient two-flow \(\mathsf{iZK }\) and \(\mathsf{SSiZK }\) protocols for a large class of languages under the (plain) \(\mathsf{DDH }\) assumption in cyclic groups in the common reference string model. As an application of \(\mathsf{iZK }\), we improve upon the round-efficiency of existing protocols for securely computing inner product under the \(\mathsf{DDH }\) assumption. This new protocol in turn provides privacy-preserving biometric authentication with lower latency.

Keywords

Hash proof systems Zero-knowledge Malicious adversaries Two-party computation Inner product 

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrice Benhamouda
    • 1
  • Geoffroy Couteau
    • 1
  • David Pointcheval
    • 1
  • Hoeteck Wee
    • 1
  1. 1.ENS, CNRS, INRIA, and PSLParisFrance