Abstract
In this work we investigate the matter of “secure control” – a novel research direction capturing security objectives specific to Industrial Control Systems (ICS). We provide an empirical analysis of the well known Tennessee Eastman process control challenge problem to gain insights into the behavior of a physical process when confronted with cyber-physical attacks. In particular, we investigate the impact of integrity and DoS attacks on sensors which measure physical phenomena. We also demonstrate how the results of process-aware security analysis can be applied to improve process resilience to cyber-physical attacks.
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Krotofil, M., Cárdenas, A.A. (2013). Resilience of Process Control Systems to Cyber-Physical Attacks. In: Riis Nielson, H., Gollmann, D. (eds) Secure IT Systems. NordSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8208. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41488-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41488-6_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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