Formal Modeling and Reasoning about the Android Security Framework
- Cite this paper as:
- Armando A., Costa G., Merlo A. (2013) Formal Modeling and Reasoning about the Android Security Framework. In: Palamidessi C., Ryan M.D. (eds) Trustworthy Global Computing. TGC 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8191. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Android OS is currently the most widespread mobile operating system and is very likely to remain so in the near future. The number of available Android applications will soon reach the staggering figure of 500,000, with an average of 20,000 applications being introduced in the Android Market over the last 6 months. Since many applications (e.g., home banking applications) deal with sensitive data, the security of Android is receiving a growing attention by the research community. However, most of the work assumes that Android meets some given high-level security goals (e.g. sandboxing of applications). Checking whether these security goals are met is therefore of paramount importance. Unfortunately this is also a very difficult task due to the lack of a detailed security model encompassing not only the interaction among applications but also the interplay between the applications and the functionalities offered by Android. To remedy this situation in this paper we propose a formal model of Android OS that allows one to formally state the high-level security goals as well as to check whether these goals are met or to identify potential security weaknesses.
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