On the Simplicity of Converting Leakages from Multivariate to Univariate

(Case Study of a Glitch-Resistant Masking Scheme)
  • Amir Moradi
  • Oliver Mischke
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40349-1_1

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8086)
Cite this paper as:
Moradi A., Mischke O. (2013) On the Simplicity of Converting Leakages from Multivariate to Univariate. In: Bertoni G., Coron JS. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2013. CHES 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8086. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Several masking schemes to protect cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks have been proposed. A few considered the glitches, and provided security proofs in presence of such inherent phenomena happening in logic circuits. One which is based on multi-party computation protocols and utilizes Shamir’s secret sharing scheme was presented at CHES 2011. It aims at providing security for hardware implementations – mainly of AES – against those sophisticated side-channel attacks that also take glitches into account. One part of this article deals with the practical issues and relevance of the aforementioned masking scheme. Following the recommendations given in the extended version of the mentioned article, we first provide a guideline on how to implement the scheme for the simplest settings. Constructing an exemplary design of the scheme, we provide practical side-channel evaluations based on a Virtex-5 FPGA. Our results demonstrate that the implemented scheme is indeed secure against univariate power analysis attacks given a basic measurement setup. In the second part of this paper we show how using very simple changes in the measurement setup opens the possibility to exploit multivariate leakages while still performing a univariate attack. Using these techniques the scheme under evaluation can be defeated using only a moderate number of measurements. This is applicable not only to the scheme showcased here, but also to most other known masking schemes where the shares of sensitive values are processed in adjacent clock cycles.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amir Moradi
    • 1
  • Oliver Mischke
    • 1
  1. 1.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr University BochumGermany

Personalised recommendations