Terrorism in Distance Bounding: Modeling Terrorist-Fraud Resistance

  • Marc Fischlin
  • Cristina Onete
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_26

Volume 7954 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Fischlin M., Onete C. (2013) Terrorism in Distance Bounding: Modeling Terrorist-Fraud Resistance. In: Jacobson M., Locasto M., Mohassel P., Safavi-Naini R. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7954. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

In distance-bounding protocols, verifiers use a clock to measure the time elapsed in challenge-response rounds, thus upper-bounding their distance to the prover. This should prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) relay attacks. Distance-bounding protocols may aim to prevent several attacks, amongst which terrorist fraud, where a dishonest prover helps the adversary to authenticate, but without passing data that allows the adversary to later authenticate on its own. Two definitions of terrorist-fraud resistance exist: a very strong notion due to Dürholz et al. [6] (which we call SimTF security), and a weaker, fuzzier notion due to Avoine et al. [1]. Recent work [7] indicates that the classical countermeasures to terrorist fraud, though intuitively sound, do not grant SimTF security. Two questions are posed in [7]: (1) Is SimTF security achievable? and (2) Can we find a definition of terrorist-fraud resistance which both captures the intuition behind it and enables efficient constructions?

We answer both questions affirmatively. For (1) we show the first provably SimTF secure distance-bounding scheme in the literature, though superior terrorist-fraud resistance comes here at the cost of security. For (2) we provide a game-based definition for terrorist-fraud resistance (called GameTF security) that captures the intuition suggested in [1], is formalized in the style of [6], and is strong enough for practical applications. We also prove that the SimTF-insecure [7] Swiss-Knife protocol isGameTF-secure. We argue that high-risk scenarios require a stronger security level, closer to SimTF security. Our SimTF secure scheme is also strSimTF secure.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Fischlin
    • 1
  • Cristina Onete
    • 1
  1. 1.CASED & Technische Universität DarmstadtGermany