Abstract
This chapter reviews some of the central theoretical challenges confronting the search for the brain basis of consciousness and develops a conceptual framework for tackling these challenges. At the heart of the search for the neural basis of consciousness is the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness. Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness requires that we acknowledge the various aspects of consciousness, for each of the aspects of consciousness raises its own set of methodological challenges. We examine the question of whether an account of the neural correlates of consciousness can be used to ascribe consciousness to creatures that lack the capacity to report their experiences, and we ask whether it is possible to go beyond the neural correlates of consciousness by providing neurally-based explanations of consciousness.
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Bayne, T., Hohwy, J. (2013). Consciousness: Theoretical Approaches. In: Cavanna, A., Nani, A., Blumenfeld, H., Laureys, S. (eds) Neuroimaging of Consciousness. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37580-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37580-4_2
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