Efficient UC-Secure Authenticated Key-Exchange for Algebraic Languages

  • Fabrice Ben Hamouda
  • Olivier Blazy
  • Céline Chevalier
  • David Pointcheval
  • Damien Vergnaud
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36362-7_18

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7778)
Cite this paper as:
Ben Hamouda F., Blazy O., Chevalier C., Pointcheval D., Vergnaud D. (2013) Efficient UC-Secure Authenticated Key-Exchange for Algebraic Languages. In: Kurosawa K., Hanaoka G. (eds) Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7778. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols enable two parties to establish a shared, cryptographically strong key over an insecure network using various authentication means, such as cryptographic keys, short (i.e., low-entropy) secret keys or credentials. In this paper, we provide a general framework, that encompasses several previous AKE primitives such as (Verifier-based) Password-Authenticated Key Exchange or Secret Handshakes, we call LAKE for Language-Authenticated Key Exchange.

We first model this general primitive in the Universal Composability (UC) setting. Thereafter, we show that the Gennaro-Lindell approach can efficiently address this goal. But we need smooth projective hash functions on new languages, whose efficient implementations are of independent interest. We indeed provide such hash functions for languages defined by combinations of linear pairing product equations.

Combined with an efficient commitment scheme, that is derived from the highly-efficient UC-secure Lindell’s commitment, we obtain a very practical realization of Secret Handshakes, but also Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange protocols. All the protocols are UC-secure, in the standard model with a common reference string, under the classical Decisional Linear assumption.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrice Ben Hamouda
    • 1
  • Olivier Blazy
    • 2
  • Céline Chevalier
    • 3
  • David Pointcheval
    • 1
  • Damien Vergnaud
    • 1
  1. 1.ENSParisFrance
  2. 2.Ruhr-Universität BochumGermany
  3. 3.Université Panthéon-AssasParisFrance

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