Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

  • Shahram Khazaei
  • Douglas Wikström
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_8

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7779)
Cite this paper as:
Khazaei S., Wikström D. (2013) Randomized Partial Checking Revisited. In: Dawson E. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2013. CT-RSA 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7779. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net.

We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shahram Khazaei
    • 1
  • Douglas Wikström
    • 1
  1. 1.KTH Royal Institute of TechnologySweden

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