Securing Circuits against Constant-Rate Tampering

  • Dana Dachman-Soled
  • Yael Tauman Kalai
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_31

Volume 7417 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Dachman-Soled D., Kalai Y.T. (2012) Securing Circuits against Constant-Rate Tampering. In: Safavi-Naini R., Canetti R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7417. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


We present a compiler that converts any circuit into one that remains secure even if a constant fraction of its wires are tampered with. Following the seminal work of Ishai et. al. (Eurocrypt 2006), we consider adversaries who may choose an arbitrary set of wires to corrupt, and may set each such wire to 0 or to 1, or may toggle with the wire. We prove that such adversaries, who continuously tamper with the circuit, can learn at most logarithmically many bits of secret information (in addition to black-box access to the circuit). Our results are information theoretic.


side-channel attackstamperingcircuit compilerPCP of proximity
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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dana Dachman-Soled
    • 1
  • Yael Tauman Kalai
    • 1
  1. 1.Microsoft Research New EnglandCambridgeUSA