Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012

Volume 7417 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 533-551

Securing Circuits against Constant-Rate Tampering

  • Dana Dachman-SoledAffiliated withMicrosoft Research New England
  • , Yael Tauman KalaiAffiliated withMicrosoft Research New England


We present a compiler that converts any circuit into one that remains secure even if a constant fraction of its wires are tampered with. Following the seminal work of Ishai et. al. (Eurocrypt 2006), we consider adversaries who may choose an arbitrary set of wires to corrupt, and may set each such wire to 0 or to 1, or may toggle with the wire. We prove that such adversaries, who continuously tamper with the circuit, can learn at most logarithmically many bits of secret information (in addition to black-box access to the circuit). Our results are information theoretic.


side-channel attacks tampering circuit compiler PCP of proximity