Authenticated and Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data

  • Mihir Bellare
  • Sriram Keelveedhi
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6841)
Cite this paper as:
Bellare M., Keelveedhi S. (2011) Authenticated and Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data. In: Rogaway P. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011. CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive treatment of the security of authenticated encryption (AE) in the presence of key-dependent data, considering the four variants of the goal arising from the choice of universal nonce or random nonce security and presence or absence of a header. We present attacks showing that universal-nonce security for key-dependent messages is impossible, as is security for key-dependent headers, not only ruling out security for three of the four variants but showing that currently standarized and used schemes (all these target universal nonce security in the presence of headers) fail to provide security for key-dependent data. To complete the picture we show that the final variant (random-nonce security in the presence of key-dependent messages but key-independent headers) is efficiently achievable. Rather than a single dedicated scheme, we present a RO-based transform RHtE that endows any AE scheme with this security, so that existing implementations may be easily upgraded to have the best possible seurity in the presence of key-dependent data. RHtE is cheap, software-friendly, and continues to provide security when the key is a password, a setting in which key-dependent data is particularly likely. We go on to give a key-dependent data treatment of the goal of misuse resistant AE. Implementations are provided and show that RHtE has small overhead.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mihir Bellare
    • 1
  • Sriram Keelveedhi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of California San DiegoLa JollaUSA

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