Side-Channel Analysis of PUFs and Fuzzy Extractors

  • Dominik Merli
  • Dieter Schuster
  • Frederic Stumpf
  • Georg Sigl
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21599-5_3

Volume 6740 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Merli D., Schuster D., Stumpf F., Sigl G. (2011) Side-Channel Analysis of PUFs and Fuzzy Extractors. In: McCune J.M., Balacheff B., Perrig A., Sadeghi AR., Sasse A., Beres Y. (eds) Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Trust 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6740. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Embedded security systems based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) offer interesting protection properties, such as tamper resistance and unclonability. However, to establish PUFs as a high security primitive in the long run, their vulnerability to side-channel attacks has to be investigated. For this purpose, we analysed the side-channel leakage of PUF architectures and fuzzy extractor implementations. We identified several attack vectors within common PUF constructions and introduce two side-channel attacks on fuzzy extractors. Our proof-of-concept attack on an FPGA implementation of a fuzzy extractor shows that it is possible to extract the cryptographic key derived from a PUF by side-channel analysis.

Keywords

Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) Fuzzy Extractor Helper Data FPGA 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dominik Merli
    • 1
  • Dieter Schuster
    • 1
  • Frederic Stumpf
    • 1
  • Georg Sigl
    • 2
  1. 1.Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information TechnologyMunichGermany
  2. 2.Institute for Security in Information TechnologyTechnische Universität MünchenMunichGermany