Statistical Attack on RC4

Distinguishing WPA
  • Pouyan Sepehrdad
  • Serge Vaudenay
  • Martin Vuagnoux
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_20

Volume 6632 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Sepehrdad P., Vaudenay S., Vuagnoux M. (2011) Statistical Attack on RC4. In: Paterson K.G. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011. EUROCRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6632. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

In this paper we construct several tools for manipulating pools of biases in the analysis of RC4. Then, we show that optimized strategies can break WEP based on 4 000 packets by assuming that the first bytes of plaintext are known for each packet. We describe similar attacks for WPA. Firstly, we describe a distinguisher for WPA of complexity 243 and advantage 0.5 which uses 240 packets. Then, based on several partial temporary key recovery attacks, we recover the full 128-bit temporary key by using 238 packets. It works within a complexity of 296. So far, this is the best attack against WPA. We believe that our analysis brings further insights on the security of RC4.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pouyan Sepehrdad
    • 1
  • Serge Vaudenay
    • 1
  • Martin Vuagnoux
    • 1
  1. 1.EPFLLausanneSwitzerland