Unconditional and Composable Security Using a Single Stateful Tamper-Proof Hardware Token
- Cite this paper as:
- Döttling N., Kraschewski D., Müller-Quade J. (2011) Unconditional and Composable Security Using a Single Stateful Tamper-Proof Hardware Token. In: Ishai Y. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6597. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Cryptographic assumptions regarding tamper proof hardware tokens have gained increasing attention. Even if the tamper-proof hardware is issued by one of the parties, and hence not necessarily trusted by the other, many tasks become possible: Tamper proof hardware is sufficient for universally composable protocols, for information-theoretically secure protocols, and even allow to create software which can only be used once (One-Time-Programs). However, all known protocols employing tamper-proof hardware are either indirect, i.e., additional computational assumptions must be used to obtain general two party computations or a large number of devices must be used. In this work we present the first protocol realizing universally composable two-party computations (and even trusted One-Time-Programs) with information-theoretic security using only one single tamper-proof device issued by one of the mutually distrusting parties.