Chapter

Theory of Cryptography

Volume 6597 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 164-181

Unconditional and Composable Security Using a Single Stateful Tamper-Proof Hardware Token

  • Nico DöttlingAffiliated withInstitute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
  • , Daniel KraschewskiAffiliated withInstitute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
  • , Jörn Müller-QuadeAffiliated withInstitute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Abstract

Cryptographic assumptions regarding tamper proof hardware tokens have gained increasing attention. Even if the tamper-proof hardware is issued by one of the parties, and hence not necessarily trusted by the other, many tasks become possible: Tamper proof hardware is sufficient for universally composable protocols, for information-theoretically secure protocols, and even allow to create software which can only be used once (One-Time-Programs). However, all known protocols employing tamper-proof hardware are either indirect, i.e., additional computational assumptions must be used to obtain general two party computations or a large number of devices must be used. In this work we present the first protocol realizing universally composable two-party computations (and even trusted One-Time-Programs) with information-theoretic security using only one single tamper-proof device issued by one of the mutually distrusting parties.

Keywords

Secure Two-Party Computation Universal Composability Tamper-Proof Hardware Information-Theoretical Security