Non-separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy – in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model (Extended Abstract)

  • Vijay V. Vazirani
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_51

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)
Cite this paper as:
Vazirani V.V. (2010) Non-separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy – in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model (Extended Abstract). In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we have failed to capture some essential elements of real markets, which seem to do a good job of finding prices that maintain parity between supply and demand.

The main point of this paper is to show that even non-separable, quasiconcave utility functions can be handled efficiently in a suitably chosen, though natural, realistic and useful, market model; our model allows for perfect price discrimination. Our model supports unique equilibrium prices and, for the restriction to concave utilities, satisfies both welfare theorems.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vijay V. Vazirani
    • 1
  1. 1.Georgia Institute of TechnologyAtlanta

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