Course Allocation by Proxy Auction

  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Mike Ruberry
  • Jonathan Ullman
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_49

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)
Cite this paper as:
Kominers S.D., Ruberry M., Ullman J. (2010) Course Allocation by Proxy Auction. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students’ reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading manipulation observed in the course allocation mechanism currently used at Harvard Business School (HBS). The proxy bidding mechanism simplifes students’ decisions by directly incorporating downgrading into the mechanism.

Our proxy bidding mechanism is Pareto efficient with respect to lexicographic preferences and can be extended to allow for a more expressive preference language which allows complementarity, substitutability, and indifference. Simulations suggest that the proxy bidding mechanism is robust to the manipulations observed in the HBS mechanism and may yield welfare improvements.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Scott Duke Kominers
    • 1
    • 2
  • Mike Ruberry
    • 3
  • Jonathan Ullman
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHarvard University 
  2. 2.Harvard Business School 
  3. 3.School of Engineering and Applied SciencesHarvard University 

Personalised recommendations