On (Group) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Payment for Facility Location Games

  • Nguyen Kim Thang
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_47

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)
Cite this paper as:
Thang N.K. (2010) On (Group) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Payment for Facility Location Games. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


We characterize the performance of strategyproof and group-strategyproof social choice rules, for placing a facility on the nodes of a metric network inhabited by N autonomous self-interested agents. Every agent owns a set of locations and caters to minimization of its cost which is the total distance from the facility to its locations. Agents may misreport their locations, so as to manipulate the outcome. A central authority has a set of allowable locations where the facility could be opened. The authority must devise a mechanism that, given the agents reports, places the facility in an allowable location that minimizes the utilitarian social cost — the sum of agents costs. A mechanism is strategyproof (SP) if no agent may misreport its locations and be better off; it is group-strategyproof (GSP) if no coalition of agents benefits by jointly misreporting their locations The requirement for (G)SP in this setting makes optimum placement of the facility impossible and, therefore, we consider approximation (G)SP mechanisms.

For SP mechanisms, we give a simple 3-approximation randomized mechanism and also provide asymptotic lower bounds for different variants. For GSP mechanisms, a (2N + 1)-approximation deterministic GSP mechanism is devised. Although the mechanism is simple, we showed that it is asymptotically optimal up to a constant. Our Ω(N1 − ε) lower bound that randomization cannot improve over the approximation factor achieved by the deterministic mechanism, when GSP is required.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nguyen Kim Thang
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.LAMSADE, CNRS FRE 3234Université de Paris-DauphineParisFrance
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of AarhusDenmark

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