Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders

  • Evangelos Markakis
  • Orestis Telelis
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_46

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)
Cite this paper as:
Markakis E., Telelis O. (2010) Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We study formally discrete bidding strategies for the game induced by the Generalized Second Price keyword auction mechanism. Such strategies have seen experimental evaluation in the recent literature as parts of iterative best response procedures, which have been shown not to converge. We give a detailed definition of iterative best response under these strategies and, under appropriate discretization of the players’ strategy spaces we find that the discretized configurations space contains socially optimal pure Nash equilibria. We cast the strategies under a new light, by studying their performance for bidders that act based on local information; we prove bounds for the worst-case ratio of the social cost of locally stable configurations, relative to the socially optimum cost.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Evangelos Markakis
    • 1
  • Orestis Telelis
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsAthens University of Economics and BusinessGreece
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of LiverpoolUK

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