Impersonation Strategies in Auctions

  • Ian A. Kash
  • David C. Parkes
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_42

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)
Cite this paper as:
Kash I.A., Parkes D.C. (2010) Impersonation Strategies in Auctions. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

A common approach to analyzing repeated auctions, such as sponsored search auctions, is to treat them as complete information games, because it is assumed that, over time, players learn each other’s types. This overlooks the possibility that players may impersonate another type. Many standard auctions (including generalized second price auctions and core-selecting auctions), as well as the Kelly mechanism, have profitable impersonations. We define a notion of impersonation-proofness for the auction mechanism coupled with a process by which players learn about each other’s type, and show an equivalence to a problem of dominant-strategy mechanism design.

Keywords

Auctions Impersonation Kelly Mechanism Ad Auctions 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ian A. Kash
    • 1
  • David C. Parkes
    • 1
  1. 1.CRCS and SEASHarvard University 

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