On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions

  • Elias Koutsoupias
  • George Pierrakos
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_27

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)
Cite this paper as:
Koutsoupias E., Pierrakos G. (2010) On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competitive with \(\mathcal{F}^{(2)}\); in this sense our model lies at the intersection of prior-free mechanism design and secretary problems. We first give a generic reduction that transforms any offline auction to an online one, with only a loss of a factor of 2 in the competitive ratio; we then present some natural auctions, both randomized and deterministic, and study their competitive ratio; our analysis reveals some interesting connections of one of these auctions with RSOP, which we further investigate in our final section.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elias Koutsoupias
    • 1
  • George Pierrakos
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Athens 
  2. 2.UC Berkeley 

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